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ABSTARCT 
 
The axioms of the expected-utility maximization theorem assure the existence of a utility function and a 
conditional-probability function such that choice among a set of lotteries under consideration would be 
equivalent to choice made by referring to the expected utilities of the prizes associated with the alternative 
lotteries. Whereas the expected-utility maximization theorem provides a theoretical foundation for analysis of 
decision-making under uncertainty, how to represent the beliefs and beliefs-updating associated with the choices 
of decision-makers within an interactive context appears to be critical in theoretical or empirical research on 
service-management and other managerial topics. This paper discusses beliefs-updating and decision-making 
with information revelation and signaling by reviewing some of the influential solution concepts and approaches 
developed to deal with the related issues in such a consistent and illuminating perspective as would facilitate 
research and instruction of this concern. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Humans acquire information with regard to themselves and the world outside themselves and interpret 
information in various ways.  Crotty (1998) proposed the hypothetical example of Tycho Brahe and Johannes 
Kepler standing together on a hall at sunrise. Brathe thought that the sun circles the earth, while Kepler believed 
that the earth circles the sun. As asked by Crotty with regard to the perceptions of Brahe and Kepler about the 
natural phenomenon and their interpretations, a question may be raised about what they see as they watch the sun 
appear at daybreak, or more precisely about whether Brathe see the sun move above the earth’s horizon, while 
Kepler sees the horizon dip below the sun. Crotty asserted that a chair, as a chair, is constructed, sustained and 
reproduced through social life, while it may exist as a phenomenal object regardless of whether any 
consciousness is aware of its existence. The diversification in human information acquisition and interpretation 
suggests the difficulty in understanding human beliefs-updating and decision-making and is investigated in one 
line of research in economics and management science by considering beliefs-updating within an interactive 
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context with information revelation and signaling. In this paper, some of the influential solution concepts and 
approaches developed to deal with the problem of beliefs-updating and decision-making within an interactive 
social context will be discussed in a consistent and illuminating perspective to facilitate theoretical or empirical 
research on service-management and other managerial topics and instruction of a similar concern.  
 
2. CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
 
Within an interactive context, decision-makers are generally assumed to be rational and intelligent 
(Myerson, 1991). As a rational and intelligent decision-maker makes decisions consistently in pursuit of her own 
objectives and uses information available to make inferences about the situation, consistency in decision making 
appears to be an important issue to be addressed in managerial and economic analysis. One axiomatic approach 
to this issue is based on acceptable beliefs regarding the preferences of a decision-maker. As mentioned by Sen 
(1996) with regard to an individual’s preferences and act of choice, an individual’s act of choice would be 
characterized by such specific features as the identity of the chooser, the set of items or the menu over which 
choice is being made, and the set of social relations and norms which may influence choice of social actions. 
Furthermore, he asserted that the preferences of an individual over a set of comprehensive outcomes should be 
distinguished from the conditional preferences over culmination outcomes given the acts of choice. A 
decision-maker’s choice under uncertainty would be associated considerably with the decision-maker’s 
conditional preferences over observable and unobservable culmination outcomes and may be illuminated by the 
derivation of the expected-utility maximization theorem and its applications in various research fields.  
As Myerson (1991) pointed out, a rational decision-maker’s preferences may be expected to satisfy some 
basic properties which can be presented as a list of axioms. Starting with decision-making as choice among 
lotteries in describing choice under uncertainty, a lottery is defined to be any function f  which specifies a 
nonnegative real number )/( txf  for every x  in X  and every t  in Ω , where X  denotes the set of 
possible prizes which the decision-maker could ultimately get and Ω  denotes the set of possible states within a 
probability measure space of the triple },,{ PFΩ . Under the axioms of interest, completeness, and transitivity, 
the preferences of a decision-maker are believed to be such that he is never indifferent between all the prizes in 
the set of possible prizes and his preferences should always form a complete transitive order over the set of 
alternatives. Axioms of monotonicity and continuity assert that an alternative with a higher probability of getting 
a better lottery among a set of lotteries is always better than one with a lower probability of getting the same 
better lottery among the same set of lotteries and a lottery that is ranked between two lotteries just is as good as 
some randomization between these two. Furthermore, by the axiom of relevance only the possible states are 
relevant to the decision-maker. Within the context of a probability measure space },,{ PFΩ , a decision-maker 
takes into consideration only relevant events S  in }{ φ≠∧∈=Ξ SFSS  such that )(SP  is not equal 
to zero. With mutually exclusive events, one of which would occur, if a decision-maker must choose between 
two alternatives and he would prefer the first alternative in each event, the substitution axioms assert that he 
must prefer the first alternative to the other one even before he learns which one of these mutually exclusive 
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events would occur. As Myerson stated with regard to the expected-utility maximization theorem, with the 
establishment of these axioms, choice among a set of lotteries L  would be equivalent to choice made by 
looking at the expected utilities of the prizes associated with the lotteries in the set L . That is, Lgf ∈∀ , , 
Ξ∈∀S , gf S≥  if and only if ))(())(( SguESfuE pp ≥ , where the axioms assure the existence of a 
utility function RXu →Ω×:  and a conditional-probability function p  such that )(: ΩΔ→Ξp  with 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ Ω∈∀≥∧=→Ω=ΩΔ ∑
Ω∈
ωωω
ω
,0)(1)(:)( qqRq .  
Within a managerial context with consumption and provision of commodities traded in markets, the types 
of prizes as contained in sets of possible prizes available to decision-makers of various types would include, but 
not limited to, quantities of goods to be consumed, monetary returns and wealth, revenues, profits, and in some 
managerial contexts such non-physical or non-monetary objects as probabilities of on-time delivery of 
commodities or services to customers. As the utility of a lottery is the expected utility of its prizes, the properties 
of the expected utility function and the prizes of lotteries play crucial parts in research dealing with uncertainty. 
However, in analysis with a focus on elements excluding preferences, risk-neutrality for the preferences of a 
decision-maker is generally assumed in analysis. As an affine transformation of an expected utility function 
would preserve the expected utility property which describes a decision-maker’s choice behavior and is also an 
expected utility function, with the assumption of risk neutrality for the preferences of a decision-maker, there 
would exist an affine transformation of the expected utility function of a decision-maker such that the expected 
values of the contingent prizes associated with an alternative would be the expected utility of the contingent 
prizes with the alternative . However, in a cost model, the type of the prize would be the cost associated with the 
operations under a decision-maker’s choice. In this case under the assumption of risk neutrality, it would be 
minimization of the expected cost or maximization of the negative of the expected cost which would be relevant 
in decision-making.  
 
3. OUTCOME SPACE AND HISTORY 
 
Whereas the axioms of the expected-utility maximization theorem assure the existence of a utility function 
and a conditional-probability function such that choice among a set of lotteries L  would be equivalent to 
choice made by referring to the expected utilities of the prizes associated with the lotteries in the set L , how to 
represent the outcome spaces and the conditional-probability function associated with the subjective choice of a 
decision-maker appears to be one of the critical issues to be considered in theoretical or empirical research. One 
line of research on decision-making appears to understand a decision-maker’s beliefs and beliefs-updating with 
respect to the culmination of outcomes within a measure-theoretic information structure by examining outcome 
spaces, information partitions or probability measures as perceived or possessed by decision-makers within 
various sequential interactive contexts. Billingsley (1986) described partial information as a subclass A~  of F  
within a probability measure space of the triple },,{ PFΩ , where Ω  is a nonempty outcome space and P  is 
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a probability measure defined on F . With regard to the perception of an observer with the information 
in )~(Aσ , he is meant to know not the pointω  drawn, but the equivalence class containing it. As Fudenburg and 
Tirole (1991) stated with regard to the concept of a correlating device represented as a triple }},{,{ PH iΩ , the 
information partition }{ iH  possessed by a decision-maker is a partition of a finite state space Ω  with an 
hi(ω ) assigned to each ω , where hi(ω ) consists of those states that a decision-maker regards as possible with 
the true stateω . A decision-maker has no information at all beyond her prior if her partition is the one-element 
set Ω , while he is well informed and has full information if each hi(ω ) in her partition is a singleton, 
containing exactly one element ω  in the set Ω . In the latter case, each culmination outcome is observed and 
distinguished by the decision-maker. 
In order to understand a decision-maker’s beliefs and beliefs-updating in an interactive managerial context, 
a general outcome space can be viewed as a product outcome space formed by the Cartesian product of the 
nature, demand, and supply outcome spaces (Chen, 2011). For an interactive context with agents of  various 
types, a general product outcome space confronting all the agents as the nature, consumers, providers, and 
governments may be represented by the agents’ types and strategies as the Cartesian product of A×Θ=Ω , 
where { }IiiiI ,...,1,),...,( 1 =Θ∈=Θ θθθ  and { }IiSsssA iiI ,...,1,),...,( 1 =∈=  with a finite 
number of types iθ  in iΘ  and feasible strategies is  in iS  for each agent i . The product outcome space 
may be so general that it would be time invariant within the time span under consideration in that the possible 
outcomes pertinent to each point of time are included therein and TΩ==Ω=Ω ...1 . This would correspond 
to the assertion of Sen (1996) that a set of comprehensive outcomes should include the entire choice process. As 
the evolving of time indexed as stages or periods, the actions taken by all the agents would be the strategies they 
put into effect at various distinct stages or periods and would form a history completely or partially perceivable 
to all the agents in interaction. All the agents may update their beliefs with respect to this interactive context by 
including the completely or partially perceivable history into her information pool and make inferences 
accordingly to form posterior beliefs about this context, represented symbolically by the measure space 
},,{ ΩΩΩ pF . Within a multi-stage interaction context, the outcome space may be extended 
to TΩ××Ω=Ω ...~ 1 , where { }IiSsss itiititIttItt ,...,1,)),...,(),,...,(( 11 =∈∧Θ∈=Ω θθθ , Tt ,...,1= ; 
that is, the extended outcome space would be a set of time/stage-indexed combinations of type profiles and 
strategy profiles. Similarly, each agent may update her beliefs with respect to this multi-stage interactive context 
by including completely or partially perceivable history into her information pool and make inferences 
accordingly to update her posterior beliefs regarding this context, represented symbolically by the measure 
space },,~{ ~~ ΩΩΩ pF . In the case that only one agent takes an action at each stage, the other agents are meant to 
take the action of “making no decision and doing nothing” at each stage. Let a history space tΩ~  refer to 
1,...1 ≥Ω××Ω tt . Thus a history tt Ω∈~~ω at the end of stage t  would be a time-indexed type-action 
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sequence taking the form of  ))),...,(),,...,(()),...,,...,(),,...,((( 11
11
1
11
1
t
I
tt
I
t
II ssss θθθθ  and would become 
the history at the beginning of stage 1+t . With time-invariant types, a history at the end of stage t would be the 
type-action sequence )),...,(),,...,(()),...,,...,(),,...,(( 11
11
11
t
I
t
III ssss θθθθ and may be viewed as an action 
path conditional on the time-invariant type profile of ),...,( 1 Iθθ at the end of stage t .  
 
4. BELIEFS AND CHOICE WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION 
 
How an agent chooses a strategy at a distinct point of time depends considerably on the beliefs he 
possesses at that point of time. With the evolving of time and history, the information possessed by 
decision-maker i  regarding tΩ~  may be represented by the information partition }{ tiH  structured in such a 
way that a culmination history as he perceives at the end of stage t  would take the following 
form: ))),...,(),,...,(()),...,,...,(),,...,((( 11
11
1
11
1
1 t
I
tt
I
tt
iIIi sshssh θθθθ , where the partial information set of 
)),...,(),,...,(( 11
k
I
kk
I
kk
i ssh θθ  contains the culmination outcome )),...,(),,...,(( 11 kIkkIk ssθθ and sample 
points equivalent to )),...,(),,...,(( 11
k
I
kk
I
k ssθθ in kΩ with tk ≤≤1  . With complete information, the 
culmination history is completely perceived by each agent and the partial information set of 
)),...,(),,...,(( 11
t
I
tt
I
tt
i ssh θθ  would contain merely the combination of the culmination type profile and action 
profile at the end of stage t , that is, )),...,(),,...,(( 11
t
I
tt
I
t ssθθ . With complete information, the culmination 
history at the end of stage t  and thus the beginning of stage 1+t  would be the type-action sequence: =tω~  
))),...,(),,...,(()),...,,...,(),,...,((( 11
11
1
11
1
t
I
tt
I
t
II ssss θθθθ .  The payoff profile pertinent to a specific history at 
the terminal stage T can be represented by )~( Tu ω , where ))~(),...,~(()~( 1 TITT uuu ωωω = . For each agent, 
her payoff at the termination stage would depend not merely on the types and strategies of her own, but also 
those of the other agents at each point of time within this interactive context. Agents’ beliefs regarding the 
culmination history at the end of each stage would play a crucial role in the sequential action choice taken by the 
agents. 
In the presence of time-invariant types and complete information, the culmination history as perceived at 
the end of stage t  would thus be the type-action sequence: =)(~ θω t  ))),...,(,()),...,,...,(,(( 1111 tItI ssss θθ , 
where ),...,( 1 Iθθθ = . Let )(φ  denote the action of “making no decision and doing nothing”. Within an 
interactive context with only one agent taking an action at each stage and agents being indexed in such a way 
that agent i  takes her move at the ith stage, in the case of time-invariant types with complete information, the 
culmination history at the end of stage t  with It <≤1  would be the type-action sequence 
of ))),...,(,()),...,,...,(,(( 1
11
1
t
I
t
I ssss θθ in which for tkj ≤≤ ,1 , )(φ≠jks as jk = and )(φ=jks  as 
jk ≠ , and for Ikjt ≤< , , )(φ=jks .  
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In the case of complete information with regard to the culmination history at the end of each stage, the 
agents would perceive the time-indexed type and action profiles. As a problem of action choice under sequential 
interaction is generally tackled with equilibrium solution concepts, analysis of action choice in the presence of 
complete information resorts considerably to the solution concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium. Let 
)( 1−thG  refer to the game from the beginning of stage t  with history 
1−th  as a game in its own. For a 
strategy profile of the whole game s  with )),...,(,)),...,,...,(( 1
11
1
T
I
T
I sssss = , a strategy profile 1/ −ths  on 
)( 1−thG  is defined as the restriction of s  to the histories consistent with 
1−th in that for each player i , 
1/ −ti hs is the restriction of is  to the histories consistent with 
1−th . As Fudenburg and Tirole (1991) 
mentioned with regard to action choice with observed types and actions, a strategy profile s  would constitute a 
subgame-perfect equilibrium if, for every 1−th , the restriction 1/ −ths to )( 1−thG is a Nash equilibrium 
of )( 1−thG . 
As illuminated in the definition of a subgame-perfect equilibrium, the solution concept of a 
subgame-perfect equilibrium depends considerably on the beliefs that equilibrium strategies would be taken by 
all the agents participating in the sequential interaction with complete information in that for every 1−th , the 
restriction 1/ −ths to )( 1−thG is a Nash equilibrium of )( 1−thG .  With the solution concept of a 
subgame-perfect equilibrium with observed types and culmination actions, an equilibrium may thus be derived 
by backward induction and the corresponding beliefs conditional on the culmination history 1−th  may be 
examined sequentially. As applied in dynamic programming in deriving a time-indexed solution, starting from 
the terminal stage with the given history of 1−Th , at the beginning of this stage an Nash-equilibrium action 
profile Ta~  would be a sequence of strategies as functions of the given history of 1−Th  , that is, 
))(~),...,(~(~ 111
−−= TTITTT hshsa  such that for every agent i , Tia~ would maximize her payoff 
)))~,(,(,( 1 Ti
T
i
T
i aahu −
− θ ) given the culmination history 1−Th  reveled to the agent, the observed agents’ types, 
and the other agents’ strategies Tia−~  with )~,~(~
T
i
T
i
T aaa −≡ . In a model with complete information regarding 
types and actions, the agents’ types are generally assumed to be observable and time-invariant. At the beginning 
of stage 1−T , as the solution concept of a subgame-perfect equilibrium stipulates, all the agents within the 
interactive context would believe that the action profile to be taken at the terminal stage T would be a 
Nash-equilibrium action profile Ta~  ; that is, 1)/~( 1~ == −Ω TTT haap  for every agent i  if Ta~ exists 
and is uniquely determined. Thus given the culmination history 2−Th  and the beliefs 
that 1)/~( 1~ == −Ω TTT haap , the agents at the beginning of stage 1−T  may choose among the feasible 
actions to form a history 1−Th , i.e., )),(,( 12 −− TT ah θ , which would maximizes their individual payoffs. As the 
terminal-stage equilibrium action profile Ta~  would be a sequence of strategies as functions of the given 
history 1−Th ; that is, ))(~),...,(~(~ 111
−−= TTITTT hshsa , the  action-choice problem confronting all the agents 
BELIEFS-UPDATING AND DECISION-MAKING 
 
 
33 
at the beginning of stage 1−T  would be to choose an action profile 1−Ta  to form a history 1−Th , i.e., 
)),(,( 12 −− TT ah θ such that for every agent i , 1~ −Tia  would maximize her payoff 
)))))~,(,(,(~,()),~,(,(,( 112112 −−
−−−
−
−− T
i
T
i
TTT
i
T
i
T
i aahaaahu θθθ  given the culmination history 2−Th  reveled to 
the agent, the observed agents’ types, and the other agents’ strategies 1~ −−
T
ia  with )~,~(
111 −
−
−− ≡ TiTiT aaa . The 
solution concept of a subgame-perfect equilibrium would thus enable the action-choice problem of the two-stage 
sub-game to be reduced to such a choice problem as a one-stage problem.  With an optimal action profile 1~ −Ta  
taken at stage 1−T , the corresponding optimal action profile Ta~  taken at stage T  , consistent with the 
history ))~,(,( 12 −− TT ah θ reveled to the agents, would be ))~,(,(~ 12 −− TTT aha θ . In a similar way, a 
subgame-perfect equilibrium for a whole multi-stage game may thus be derived.  
As noted by Harris (2007), in city-pair airline markets with easy entry and low customer switching costs, a 
new entrant is confronted with fast incumbent response. Harris analyzed a two-stage entry 
deterrence/accommodation game in city-pair airline markets with the aid of the solution concept of a 
subgame-perfect equilibrium. In their study, Ma and McGuire (1997) applied the solution concept of a 
subgame-perfect equilibrium to a multi-stage game in examining the action choices of the patient and the 
physician within an interactive medical context in which the quantity of treatment decided by the patient or the 
effort deicide by the physician is not contractible. However, within a medical context, the input of medical 
capital goods plays a critical role in the action choices of the patient, the physician, and the insurer and may be 
measured and verified ex post. To allow for substitution between a verifiable variable and an unverifiable 
variable at the physician’s disposable and better represent the reality of incentives and behaviors in a medical 
context from the perspectives of the patient, the physician, and the insurer, the study of Chen, Lin and Hsieh 
(2008) extended the model of Ma and McGuire by including the physician’s decision of the input of medical 
capital goods under the payment decisions made by the insurer to examine optimal medical investment and 
insurance under a subgame-perfect equilibrium. With positive payments to the physician, cost reduction or 
benefit improving is obtainable, as the study suggested, through a reduction in the social loss by restraining 
overinvestment in medical capital goods, while a fully prospective payment system would be a cost-minimizing 
payment system but not definitely a benefit-improving system. 
 
5. BELIEFS AND CHOICE WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
 
Within an interactive context with unobservable outcomes, agents would use all relevant information 
available to them to make inferences about unobservable outcomes. While unobservable outcomes within an 
entire outcome space Ω~  would include not only unobservable types but also actions, unobservable types are 
frequently encountered in decision-making and include such types as commodity quality, market demand, labor 
productivity, technology, knowledge, costs, and risks associated with objects or individuals relevant to 
decision-making. As Bayesian decision theory provides a foundation for the logical roots of a theory dealing 
Chunyuan Chen 
 
34 
with social interaction with beliefs-updating and decision-making such as game theory (Myerson, 1991), 
theoretically agents’ beliefs up-dating with regard to unobserved outcomes may be understood with the aid of 
Bayesian decision theory and solution concepts in game theory.  
      As mentioned previously, the outcome space within a multi-stage interaction context may be represented 
symbolically by such a product space as TΩ××Ω=Ω ...~ 1 , 
where { }IiSsss itiititIttItt ,...,1,)),...,(),,...,(( 11 =∈∧Θ∈=Ω θθθ , Tt ,...,1= . A history Ω∈~~Tω  at 
the end of stage T  would be a time-indexed type-action 
sequence )),...,(),,...,(()),...,,...,(),,...,(( 11
11
1
11
1
T
I
TT
I
T
II ssss θθθθ . To describe beliefs-updating in another 
perspective, the outcome space within a multi-stage interaction context may be equivalently perceived and 
represented by the product space TS
T Ω×Ω=Ω Θ .ˆ , where 
{ }IiitiTITIT ,...,1,)),...,(),...,,...,(( 1111 =Θ∈=ΩΘ θθθθθ  is the time-indexed outcome space of types and 
{ }IiSsssss itiTITITS ,...,1,)),...,(),...,,...,(( 1111 =∈=Ω is the time-indexed outcome space of feasible actions. 
Let a history space tΩˆ refer to 1, ≥Ω×ΩΘ ttSt  . A history tt Ω∈ ˆωˆ  at the end of stage t  would thus be a 
time-indexed type-action combination of ))),...,(),...,,...,(()),,...,(),...,,...,((( 1
11
11
11
1
t
I
t
I
t
I
t
I ssssθθθθ , with 
the type profiles within one time-indexed sequence and the action profiles within another. Given a history of  
))),...,(),...,,...,(()),,...,(),...,,...,((( 1
11
11
11
1
t
I
t
I
t
I
t
I ssssθθθθ , agents may use the information embedded in the 
culmination history to make inferences about the unobservable outcomes or the future events evolving within 
this interactive context, symbolically represented by the measure space },,ˆ{ ˆˆ ΩΩΩ pF . An agent may be so 
poorly informed that he knows only her own types and actions within a given history. In this case, the history as 
agent i  perceives at the end of stage t  would be the set of 
histories ))),(),...,,.(()),,(),...,,((( 1
11
11
11
1
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i SsSs −−−− ΘΘ θθ instead of the culmination 
history ))),...,(),...,,...,(()),,...,(),...,,...,((( 1
11
11
11
1
t
I
t
I
t
I
t
I ssssθθθθ . The information partition as perceived by 
agent i  with respect to the types of each of the other agents at each stage would be a whole type set 
ijj ≠Θ ,   .  
If an information partition of jΘ  as perceived by agent i  at stage t  is not the whole type set jΘ  , 
but an informative partition
 
t
jH }{ , agent i  may update her beliefs with regard to the marginal probability of 
the event jθ  conditional on the information set )( jtjh θ  and all other information available to him at that 
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point of time, including the history as he may perceive. As states in a state space in discussion such as the types 
in Ijj ,...,1, =Θ are generally assumed to have positive prior probability with states of probability 0 dropped 
from a state space, agent i  may update her beliefs regarding the marginal probability of the event jθ  
conditional merely on the information set )( j
t
jh θ simply by forming the conditional probability 
as ∑
∈′
ΘΘΘ ′=
)(
)()())(/(
j
t
jj
jjj
h
jjj
t
jj pPhP
θθ
θθθθ .  However, belief-updating with regard to unobserved 
outcomes conditional on such revealed information as histories with time-indexed culmination types and actions 
would frequently depends not only on assumptions about prior beliefs regarding individual state spaces, but also 
on equilibrium solution concepts in making inferences about the culmination of a joint type-action outcome. 
Conditional beliefs play a crucial role in decision-making. In discussing difficulty with marginalization 
paradoxes for improper priors as noted by Stone and Dawid, Hartigan (1983) considered the case of the uniform 
distribution over pairs of positive integers },{ ji , whose desired conditional distribution of },{ ji  
given 0jj =  is uniform over i . As Hartigan mentioned, the conditional distribution given j  and the 
marginal distribution should be combined to return to the joint distribution by 
following )()/(),( 00 jpjipjip = . The marginal probabilities )( 0jp  are not determined by ),( jip , since 
the event ]},,[{ 0jjji =  is not given a probability. The problem of belief-updating with respect to 
unobserved types conditional on histories with observed actions has been tackled with various solution concepts 
in game-theoretic business research. Among the various solution concepts, the solution concept of perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium plays a crucial role in the determination of a solution to a problem of incomplete 
information with unobserved types and observed actions as information-revealing signals. 
Based on Bayesian decision theory, the solution concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium possesses the 
concepts embedded in the solution concepts of a Bayesian equilibrium and a subgame-perfect equilibrium. As 
the agents take moves simultaneously for the one-move interaction with private information regarding their own 
types within an interactive context, each agent may be able to make inferences about the types of the other 
agents merely conditional on her private information. Within the one-stage interaction, the context as perceived 
by each agent may be represented symbolically by the measure space },,ˆ{ ˆˆ ΩΩΩ pF , 
where { }IiSsss iiiiII ,...,1,)),...,(),,...,((ˆ 11 =∈∧Θ∈=Ω θθθ . The belief of agent i  about the 
types of the other agents may be represented by ( )iip θθ−Ωˆ
 
. Let the set iiS
Θ of maps from iΘ  to iS  be 
each agent i ’s space of pure strategies. As mentioned by Fudenburg and Tirole (1991) with regard to a Bayesian 
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equilibrium , ))((),(( ⋅⋅ −ii ss  constitutes a Bayesian equilibrium if 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) i
i i
i
ii
iiiiiiiiii
Ss
i Ssssps
Θ
−−−−Ω∈⋅′
∈⋅′⋅′∈⋅ ∑∑
−
Θ
     ,,,,,maxarg)( ˆ
θ θ
θθθμθθ for each agent i  .  Each 
agent i  may use her prior beliefs of the marginal probability )(ˆ ip θΩ  and the conditional probability 
( )iip θθ−Ωˆ  to derive the probability of ( )iip −Ω θθ ,ˆ . As a type with zero probability would not be considered 
in decision-making and would thus be irrelevant in analysis, each type under consideration in decision-making 
would have a positive probability. Therefore, the condition that 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )∑∑
−
Θ −−−−∈⋅′
⋅′∈⋅
ii
i
ii
iiiiiiiii
Ss
i sspps
θθ
θθθμθθθ ,,,maxarg)(  would enable the ex ante formulation for a 
Bayesian equilibrium ))((),(( ⋅⋅ −ii ss to be represented equivalently as
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )∑
−
Θ −−−−∈⋅′
⋅′∈
i
i
ii
iiiiiiii
Ss
ii ssps
θ
θθθμθθθ ,,maxarg)(  for each ii Θ∈θ .  
In the presence of histories with observed actions within a context with multi-stage interaction, an agent 
may use not merely her private information regarding her own types, but also the information of the observed 
actions in decision-making. Beliefs-updating within a perfect Bayesian equilibrium would depend on an 
equilibrium solution concept, processing of the information revealed by observed actions and understanding of 
equilibrium strategies with the aid of Bayes’ rule to make inferences about the unobserved outcomes. As shown 
by Fudenburg and Tirole (1991) with regard to the solution concept of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a 
two-agent and two-stage model, suppose that agent 1 has private information with regard to her type θ  in Θ , 
which is unobservable to agent 2. In the first stage, player 1 player 1 reveals her action 1a . The culmination 
history would be ),( 1aθ . While agent 2 perceives the action 1a  at the end of stage one, she has no further 
information except her understanding of the time span 2=T and prior beliefs about the unobserved type θ , 
represented by )(ˆ θΩp . With the information of the observed action 1a and her understanding of the mixed 
strategy )/(1 θσ ⋅  which would be taken by agent 1, agent 2 may update her beliefs at the end of stage 1 from 
)(ˆ θΩp  to )/( 1ˆ ap θΩ by using Bayes’ rule as ))()/(/()()/()/( 11111ˆ θθσθθσθ θ ′′= ∑′Ω papaap . As 
agent 2 takes a mixed strategy )/( 12 a⋅σ conditional on the observed action taken by agent 1 in the first stage, 
the payoff of agent 1 with type θ  and a strategy )/(1 θσ ⋅ would be 
),,()/()/(),,( ,21112211,211
21
θσθσθσσ aauaaau
aa
∑∑= . As agent 1 takes the strategy of )/(1 θσ ⋅ , 
the ex ante payoff of player 2 to strategy )/( 12 a⋅σ  when player 1 plays )/(1 θσ ⋅  is 
)),,()/()/(()( ,21212211
21
θσθσθ
θ
aauaaap
aa
∑∑∑ . However, with her prior beliefs )(ˆ θΩp being 
updated to )/( 1ˆ ap θΩ after observing the action 1a  taken by player 1 in the first stage, the ex post payoff of 
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player 2 would be ∑ ∑∑ ΩΩ θ θσθ ),,()/()/()( ,2121221ˆ1ˆ 21 aauaaapap aa . If 
))/(),/(),/(( 1ˆ1
*
2
*
1 apa θσθσ Ω⋅⋅  constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, θ∀ ,
 
),,(maxarg)/( *211
*
1
1
θσσθσ
σ
u∈⋅ and 1a∀ , ∑ Ω∈⋅ θσ θσθσ ),,()/(maxarg)/( ,2121ˆ1*2 2 auapa .  
For a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the strategies are optimal given the beliefs and the beliefs are updated 
with the information revealed by the strategies. Due to the relation of circularity, a solution to a problem with 
incomplete information with the aid of the solution concept of PBE is determined by the existence of a set of 
strategies and beliefs consistent with the circularity relation, and cannot be derived by backward induction. The 
concept of consistency plays a crucial role in the refined solution concept of a sequential equilibrium proposed 
by Kreps and Wilson (1982).  In the case that for each θ , there exits a unique 1a  such that 1)/( 1*1 =θσ a  
and 0)~/( 1
*
1 =θσ a for θθ ≠~ , a perfect Bayesian equilibrium would be a separation equilibrium with the 
posterior beliefs )/( 1ˆ ap θΩ  equal to one. The solution concept of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a 
two-stage and two agent model may be extended to a multi-stage and multi-agent framework under assumptions 
made about beliefs-updating. Among these are assumptions regarding the prior beliefs about the unobserved 
types and sequential beliefs-updating for deriving the stage-indexed posterior beliefs.   With regard to an 
outcome space with invariant types ),...,( 1 Iθθ , the unobserved types are frequently assumed to be independent 
and the prior distribution ),...,( 1ˆ Ip θθΩ would thus be equal to  the product of marginal 
probabilities∏
=
Ω
I
i
ip
1
ˆ )(θ . With the prior beliefs )(ˆ ip θΩ for each iθ  and ),...,( 1ˆ Ip θθΩ for the joint 
outcome ),...,( 1 Iθθ as possessed by each agent, each agent i  may update her beliefs about all jθ  after 
observing the history of ),(ˆ 11 aθω =  at the end of stage 1 by Bayes’ rule:
 ))~()~,ˆ/(/()(),ˆ/(),ˆ/(( ˆ
~
01
ˆ
0110
ˆ jjjjjjjjj papaap
j
θθωσθθωσωθ
θ ΩΩΩ
∑= , where )(ˆ 0 φω = . 
Beliefs-updating may be made in the successive stages in a similar way 
as: ))ˆ/~()~,ˆ/(/()ˆ/(),ˆ/(),ˆ/(( 1ˆ
~
11
ˆ
11
ˆ
−
Ω
−−
Ω
−−
Ω ∑= tjjttjjtjjttjjttj papaap
j
ωθθωσωθθωσωθ
θ
. If the 
prior beliefs about the types ),...,( 1 Iθθ  vary among the agents, the beliefs )(ˆ jp θΩ for each jθ  may thus 
be indexed by the agent as )(ˆ j
ip θΩ for the prior probability possessed by agent i  that agent j’s type is jθ  and 
the prior beliefs ),...,( 1ˆ I
ip θθΩ would be equal to the product of marginal probabilities∏
=
Ω
I
j
j
ip
1
ˆ )(θ under the 
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understanding of independent types. With the prior beliefs )(ˆ j
ip θΩ , each agent i  may update her beliefs 
about all
 j
θ  after observing the culmination history of ),(ˆ 11 aθω =  at the end of stage 1 by Bayes’ rule:
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ˆ
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i
jjjj
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jjjj
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θθωσθθωσωθ
θ ΩΩΩ
∑= . Each agent i  may make 
beliefs-updating in the successive stages in a similar way by the 
rule: ))ˆ/~()~,ˆ/(/()ˆ/(),ˆ/(),ˆ/(( 1ˆ
~
11
ˆ
11
ˆ
−
Ω
−−
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−−
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θ
. 
Within an interactive managerial context, decision-makers would seek and use relevant information to 
update beliefs. A firm may acquire information before making an important decision or undertaking a major 
investment by accessing such external sources of information as marketing, strategic, or information technology 
consultants, legal advisors, auditors, financial research firms, and information services companies offering 
electronic services Individuals may also solicit information from various information sources before taking 
important actions. Sometimes, it would be worthwhile for buyers of used car to invest in a diagnostic check by a 
trusted mechanic or acquire online information about the history of the vehicle of the specific model they intend 
to purchase (Arora and Fosfuri, 2005). As mentioned by Gal-Or et al (2006) with regard to information 
acquisition in advertising industries, companies may present those potential individuals or households with 
commercials of their interest by using new technologies to better identify those potential customers who would 
be interested in their products or services. They noted that a personal video recorder (PVR) is programmable and 
addressable and can record and disclose the viewing patterns and choices of identifiable households. The 
personal video recorder facilitates companies’ construction of demographic profiles of viewers and use of 
targeted advertising.  
By analyzing a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a product market where consumers know the quality of an 
incumbent product from its tract record but are uncertain about quality of a new entrant, Balachander (2001) 
investigated the role warranty would play in quality signaling. As suggested by the study, in response to the offer 
of a longer warranty by a new entrant an incumbent product may optimally not react with its warranty. 
Balachander stated that empirical researchers have presented empirical evidence on how warranty and quality 
are related in a product market but should adjust for differences in consumer knowledge about products in testing 
the occurrence of signalling with warranties. In contrast to quality signaling by warranty, Stock and Balachander 
(2005) analyzed marketers’ use of product scarcity as a marketing tool in quality signaling in a product market 
with customers possessing heterogonous information regarding the quality of the product in that later buyers are 
uninformed consumers in their model. As suggested by their study, unlike a signal produced by price a scarcity 
strategy affects only the sales from uninformed consumers. Thus, under some conditions signaling through 
scarcity would be more efficient than price. Bagnoli and Watts (2005) examined managers’ decisions on 
adopting more or less conservative financial reporting policies under generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) by considering the conditions under which the manager’s exercise of discretion may be used by the 
market to infer her private information about the future prospects and value of the firm. The model developed by 
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Spence (1974) for the choice of education level is one of the most influential models with quality signaling. In 
the study of Spence, a worker is attributed with a certain level of ability and decides to choose a level of 
education. The level of education chosen by a worker would serve as a signal of the worker’s ability 
unobservable to a firm. Among other studies concerning signaling and decision-making are the works of Kreps 
and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) regarding reputation, predation, and entry deterrence under 
incomplete information. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The axioms of the expected-utility maximization theorem assure the existence of a utility function and a 
conditional-probability function such that choice among a set of lotteries under consideration would be 
equivalent to choice made by referring to the expected utilities of the prizes associated with the alternative 
lotteries. Whereas the expected-utility maximization theorem provides a theoretical foundation for analysis of 
choice under uncertainty, how to represent the beliefs and beliefs-updating associated with the choices of 
decision-makers within an interactive context appears to be critical in theoretical or empirical research on 
service-management and other managerial topics, such as pricing of services, quality management and quality 
signaling, customer relationship management, production and operations management of services, insurance and 
healthcare management, and contracts and mechanism design. Such influential solution concepts and approaches 
to dealing with the related issues as discussed in this paper not merely demonstrated the diversified creative 
endeavors to tackle the problem of beliefs-updating and decision-making, but also signaled the difficulty of the 
problem and the necessity of further research effort.  
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